Η τοποθεσία σου
       

Payment icons

       

Έχεις μια καλύτερη τιμή γι αυτό το βιβλίο;

Γίνε συνεργάτης και καταχώρησε την προσφορά σου!

Γίνετε Πωλητής / Υποβολή Προσφοράς

Περιγραφή

According to the widespread conceptualist view, all mental contents are governed by concepts an individual possesses. In recent years, however, an increasing number of philosophers have argued for the indispensability of nonconceptual content based on perceptual, emotional, and qualitative experiences; informational and computational states; memory; and practical knowledge. Writers from disciplines as varied as the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, epistemology, linguistics, religious psychology, and aesthetics have challenged conceptualism. This book offers some of the most important work on nonconceptual content in the philosophy of mind and psychology. Part I presents influential positions that have helped to shape the contemporary debate. Part II focuses on arguments informed specifically by the naturalization of intentionality or the characterization of computational structure. Part III offers various attempts at motivating the need for nonconceptual content based on experiential phenomena such as perception, emotion, and memory. Finally, part IV considers whether nonconceptual content can be used to explain the behavior of entities lacking conceptual capacities in addition to the actions of individuals possessing concepts. York H. Cunther is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at California State University at Northridge. (from the publisher) + Περιεχόμενα Acknowledgments Contributors General Introduction Part Ι Preliminaries Chapter 1 Sensation and Perception (1981) Fred Dretske Chapter 2 Demonstrative Identification (1982) Gareth Evans Chapter 3 Nonconceptual Content (1994) John McDowell Part II Naturalism and Computation Chapter 4 What Might Nonconceptual Content Be? (1998) Robert Stalnaker Chapter 5 Scenarios, Concepts, and Perception (1992) Christopher Peacocke Chapter 6 Content, Conceptual Content, and Nonconceptual Content (1990) Adrian Cussins Chapter 7 Connectionism and Cognitive Flexibility (1994) Andy Clark Chapter 8 Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States (1995) Jose Luis Bermudez Part ΙΙΙ The Nature of Experience Chapter 9 The Nonconceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain (2001) Sean Kelly Chapter 10 The Waterfall Illusion (1988) Tim Crane Chapter 11 Perception, Concepts, and Memory (1992) Michael Martin Chapter 12 Perception, Sensation, and Nonconceptual Content (1994) D. W. Hamlyn Chapter 13 A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character (1997) Michael Tye Chapter 14 Emotion and Force (2003) York H. Gunther Part IV The Autonomy Thesis Chapter 15 Peacocke's Argument against the Autonomy of Nonconceptual Representational Content (1994) Jose Luis Bermudez Chapter 16 Nonconceptual Content: Kinds, Rationales, and Relations (1994) Christopher Peacocke References Index +
9780262571616
1 Αντίτυπο(α)
Χρόνος αποστολής και χρεώσεις:

Λεπτομερειες

Εκδότης
MIT PRESS
ISBN
9780262571616
Σελίδες
384
Έκδοση
2003
Τύπος
ΕΝΤΥΠΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ
Κατάσταση
Καινουριο
Διαστάσεις
23x18

Συγγραφέας: ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΚΟ

Εγγραφείτε στο newsletter μας και μάθετε πρώτοι όλα τα νέα βιβλία, τις εξαιρετικές τιμές και τις εκδηλώσεις μας.

Ισως θελετε να δείτε και...