Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? In this book, some of the sharpest minds in philosophy struggle with these questions. (From the publisher) + Περιεχόμενα 1. Introduction [Ruth Chang] 2. Incommensurability: What's the Problem? [James Griffin] 3. Incommensurability: Four Proposals [David Wiggins] 4. Is Incommensurability Vagueness? [John Broome] 5. Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods [Elizabeth Anderson] 6. Incommensurability and Agency [Joseph Raz] 7. Value, Comparability, and Choice [Donald Regan] 8. Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning [Elijah Millgram] 9. Leading a Life [Charles Taylor] 10. Comparing the Incomparable: Trade-offs and Sacrifices [Stephen Lukes] 11. Abstract and Concrete Value: Plurality, Conflict, and Maximization [Michael Stocker] 12. Commensuration and Public Reason [John Finnis] 13. Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in Law [Cass R. Sunstein] +
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